Agenda

Advisory Committee on Rules of Civil Procedure

November 20, 2019

4:00 to 6:00 p.m.

Scott M. Matheson Courthouse

450 South State Street

Judicial Council Room

Administrative Office of the Courts, Suite N31

Welcome and approval of minutes.	4:00	Tab 1	Jonathan Hafen, Chair
Forming a technology subcommittee	4:05		Trevor Lee, Susan Vogel, Paul Stancil
Rule 26.4: discussion of "preferred means of communication"	4:15	Tab 2	Nancy Sylvester and Judge Laura Scott
Amendments to Rule 7A based on comments, new Rule 7B	4:30	Tab 3	Lauren DiFrancesco (subcommittee chair), Jim Hunnicutt, Judge Holmberg, Susan Vogel.
Rule 68 Subcommittee Report	5:10	Tab 4	Judge Clay Stucki (subcommittee chair), Leslie Slaugh, Rod Andreason, Susan Vogel, Rep. Brady Brammer, Ken Ivory Guests: Charles Stormont; Douglas B. Cannon, Utah Association for Justice
Advisory committee notes	As time permits	Tab 5	Group C: Rod N. Andreason, Leslie Slaugh, Trystan Smith, Tim Pack Group D: Judge Andrew Stone, Judge James Blanch, Bryan Pattison, Judge Laura Scott
Other business	5:55		Jonathan Hafen, Chair

Committee Webpage: http://www.utcourts.gov/committees/civproc/

2020 Meeting Schedule:

January 22, 2020 June 24, 2020

February 26, 2020 September 23, 2020

March 25, 2020 October 28, 2020

April 22, 2020 November 18, 2020

May 27, 2020



Nancy Sylvester

Rule 7A subcommittee proposal

DiFrancesco, Lauren E.H.

Fri, Sep 20, 2019 at 9:53 AM

To: Nancy Sylvester, Jim Hunnicutt, Judge Kent Holmberg, Leslie Slaugh, Susan Vogel

Cc: "DiFrancesco, Lauren E.H."


Nancy -


The Rule 7A subcommittee met last night and here are our final drafts for the committee for new proposed Rules 7A and 7B. With these two new rules, I think Rule 7(g) should now be deleted. And we recognize the adoption Rule 7B may require some changes to Rule 101, which Judge Holmberg has agreed to discuss with the appropriate committee. We believe our changes address the comments, and to the extent it's not clear from the text that they do, we are happy to discuss it. Please let me know if there's anything else you need from our subcommittee before next week's meeting.

Best. Lauren

Lauren E.H. DiFrancesco (née Hosler) | Attorney STOEL RIVES LLP |

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URCP007A. New. Draft: September 20, 2019

Rule 7A. Motion to enforce order and for sanctions.

(a) Motion. To enforce a court order or to obtain a sanctions order for violation of an order, a party must file an ex-parte motion to enforce order and for sanctions (if requested), pursuant to this rule and Rule 7. The motion must be filed in the same case in which that order was entered. The timeframes set forth in this rule, rather than those set forth in Rule 7, govern motions to enforce orders and for sanctions.

- **(b) Affidavit.** The motion must state the title and date of entry of the order that the moving party seeks to enforce. The motion must be verified, or must be accompanied by at least one supporting affidavit that is based on personal knowledge and shows that the affiant is competent to testify on the matters set forth. The verified motion or affidavit must set forth facts that would be admissible in evidence and that would support a finding that the party has violated the order.
- **(c) Proposed order.** The motion must be accompanied by a request to submit for decision and a proposed order to attend hearing, which must:
 - (c)(1) state the title and date of entry of the order that the motion seeks to enforce;
 - (c)(2) state the relief sought in the motion;
 - (c)(3) state whether the motion is requesting that the other party be held in contempt and, if so, state that the penalties for contempt may include, but are not limited to, a fine of up to \$1000 and confinement in jail for up to 30 days;
 - (c)(4) order the other party to appear personally or through counsel at a specific place (the court's address) and date and time (left blank for the court clerk to fill in) to explain whether the nonmoving party has violated the order; and
 - (c)(5) state that no written response to the motion is required but is permitted if filed within 14 days of service of the order, unless the court sets a different time, and that any written response must follow the requirements of Rule 7.

(d)

- (d) Service of the order. If the court issues an order to attend a hearing, the moving party must have the order, motion, and all supporting affidavits served on the nonmoving party at least 28 days before the hearing. Service must be in a manner provided in Rule 4 if the nonmoving party is not represented by counsel in the case. If the nonmoving party is represented by counsel in the case, service must be made on the nonmoving party's counsel of record in a manner provided in Rule 5. For purposes of this rule, a party is represented by counsel if, within the last 120 days, counsel for that party has served or filed any documents in the case. The court may shorten the 28 day period if:
 - (d)(1) the motion requests an earlier date; and
 - (d)(2) it clearly appears from specific facts shown by affidavit that immediate and irreparable injury, loss, or damage will result to the moving party if the hearing is not held sooner.
- **(e) Opposition.** A written opposition is not required, but if filed, must be filed within 14 days of service of the order, unless the court sets a different time, and must follow the requirements of Rule 7.

URCP007A. New. Draft: September 20, 2019

(f) Reply. If the nonmoving party files a written opposition, the moving party may file a reply within 7 days of the filing of the opposition to the motion, unless the court sets a different time. Any reply must follow the requirements of Rule 7.

- (g) Hearing. At the hearing the court may receive evidence, hear argument, and rule upon the motion, or may request additional briefing or hearings. The moving party bears the burden of proof on all claims made in the motion. At the court's discretion, the court may convene a telephone conference before the hearing to preliminarily address any issues related to the motion, including whether the court would like to order a briefing schedule other than as set forth in this rule.
- **(h) Limitations.** This rule does not apply to an order that is issued by the court on its own initiative. This rule does not apply in criminal cases or motions filed under <u>Rule 37</u>. Nothing in this rule is intended to limit or alter the inherent power of the court to initiate order to show cause proceedings to assess whether cases should be dismissed for failure to prosecute or to otherwise manage the court's docket, or to limit the authority of the court to hold a party in contempt for failure to appear pursuant to a court order.
- (i) Orders to show cause. The process set forth in this rule replaces and supersedes the prior order to show cause procedure. An order to attend hearing serves as an order to show cause as that term is used in Utah law.

URCP007B. New. Draft: September 20, 2019

Rule 7B. Motion to enforce order and for sanctions in domestic law matters.

(a) Motion. To enforce a court order or to obtain a sanctions order for violation of an order, a party must file an ex-parte motion to enforce order and for sanctions (if requested), pursuant to this rule and Rule 7. The motion must be filed in the same case in which that order was entered. The timeframes set forth in this rule, rather than those set forth in Rule 7, govern motions to enforce orders and for sanctions. If the motion is to be heard by a commissioner, the motion must also follow the procedures of Rule 101. For purpose of this rule, an order includes a decree.

- **(b) Affidavit.** The motion must state the title and date of entry of the order that the moving party seeks to enforce. The motion must be verified, or must be accompanied by at least one supporting affidavit that is based on personal knowledge and shows that the affiant is competent to testify on the matters set forth. The verified motion or affidavit must set forth facts that would be admissible in evidence and that would support a finding that the party has violated the order.
- **(c) Proposed order.** The motion must be accompanied by a request to submit for decision and a proposed order to attend hearing, which must:
 - (c)(1) state the title and date of entry of the order that the motion seeks to enforce;
 - (c)(2) state the relief sought in the motion;

- (c)(3) state whether the motion is requesting that the other party be held in contempt and, if so, state that the penalties for contempt may include, but are not limited to, a fine of up to \$1000 and confinement in jail for up to 30 days;
- (c)(4) order the other party to appear personally or through counsel at a specific place (the court's address) and date and time (left blank for the court clerk to fill in) to explain whether the nonmoving party has violated the order; and
- (c)(5) state that no written response to the motion is required, but is permitted if filed at least 14 days before the hearing, unless the court sets a different time, and that any written response must follow the requirements of Rule 7, and Rule 101 if the hearing will be before a commissioner.
- (d) Service of the order. If the court issues an order to attend a hearing, the moving party must have the order, motion, and all supporting affidavits served on the nonmoving party at least 28 days before the hearing. Service must be in a manner provided in Rule 4 if the nonmoving party is not represented by counsel in the case. If the nonmoving party is represented by counsel in the case, service must be made on the nonmoving party's counsel of record in a manner provided in Rule 5. For purposes of this rule, a party is represented by counsel if, within the last 120 days, counsel for that party has served or filed any documents in the case. The court may shorten the 28 day period if:
 - (d)(1) the motion requests an earlier date; and
 - (d)(2) it clearly appears from specific facts shown by affidavit that immediate and irreparable injury, loss, or damage will result to the moving party if the hearing is not held sooner.

URCP007B. New. Draft: September 20, 2019

(e) Opposition. A written opposition is not required, but if filed, must be filed at least 14 days before the hearing, unless the court sets a different time, and must follow the requirements of Rule 7, and Rule 101 if the hearing will be before a commissioner.

- **(f) Reply.** If the nonmoving party files a written opposition, the moving party may file a reply at least 7 days before the hearing, unless the court sets a different time. Any reply must follow the requirements of Rule 7, and Rule 101 if the hearing will be before a commissioner.
- **(g) Hearing.** At the hearing the court may receive evidence, hear argument, and rule upon the motion, or may request additional briefing or hearings. The moving party bears the burden of proof on all claims made in the motion. At the court's discretion, the court may convene a telephone conference before the hearing to preliminarily address any issues related to the motion, including whether the court would like to order a briefing schedule other than as set forth in this rule.
- (h) Counter Motions. A responding party may request affirmative relief only by filing a counter motion, to be heard at the same hearing. A counter motion need not be limited to the subject matter of the original motion. All of the provisions of this rule apply to counter motions except that a counter motion must be filed and served with the opposition. Any opposition to the counter motion must be filed and served no later than the reply to the motion. Any reply to the opposition to the counter motion must be filed and served at least 3 business days before the hearing in a manner that will cause the reply to be actually received by the party responding to the counter motion (i.e. hand-delivery, fax or other electronic delivery as allowed by rule or agreed by the parties). The party who filed the counter motion bears the burden of proof on all claims made in the counter motion. A separate proposed order is required only for counter motions to enforce a court order or to obtain a sanctions order for violation of an order, in which case the proposed order for the counter motion must:
 - (h)(1) state the title and date of entry of the order that the counter motion seeks to enforce;
 - (h)(2) state the relief sought in the counter motion;

- (h)(3) state whether the counter motion is requesting that the other party be held in contempt and, if so, state that the penalties for contempt may include, but are not limited to, a fine of up to \$1000 and confinement in jail for up to 30 days;
- (h)(4) order the other party to appear personally or through counsel at the scheduled hearing to explain whether that party has violated the order; and
- (h)(5) state that no written response to the countermotion is required, but that a written response is permitted if filed at least 7 days before the hearing, unless the court sets a different time, and that any written response must follow the requirements of <u>Rule 7</u>, and <u>Rule 101</u> if the hearing will be before a commissioner.
- **(i) Limitations.** This rule does not apply to an order that is issued by the court on its own initiative. This rule applies only to domestic relations actions, including divorce; temporary separation; separate maintenance; parentage; custody; child support; adoptions; cohabitant abuse protective orders; child protective orders; civil stalking injunctions; grandparent visitation; and modification actions. Nothing in this

URCP007B. New. Draft: September 20, 2019

rule is intended to limit or alter the inherent power of the court to initiate order to show cause proceedings to assess whether cases should be dismissed for failure to prosecute or to otherwise manage the court's docket, or to limit the authority of the court to hold a party in contempt for failure to appear pursuant to a court order.

(j) Orders to show cause. The process set forth in this rule replaces and supersedes the prior order to show cause procedure. An order to attend hearing serves as an order to show cause as that term is used in Utah law.

URCP 26.

Advisory Committee Notes

Disclosure requirements and timing. Rule 26(a)(1).

The 2011 amendments seek to reduce discovery costs by requiring each party to produce, at an early stage in the case, and without a discovery request, all of the documents and physical evidence the party may offer in its case-in-chief and the names of witnesses the party may call in its case-in-chief, with a description of their expected testimony. In this respect, the amendments build on the initial disclosure requirements of the prior rules. In addition to the disclosures required by the prior version of Rule 26(a)(1), a party must disclose each fact witness the party may call in its case-in-chief and a summary of the witness's expected testimony, a copy of all documents the party may offer in its case-in-chief, and all documents to which a party refers in its pleadings.

Not all information will be known at the outset of a case. If discovery is serving its proper purpose, additional witnesses, documents, and other information will be identified. The scope and the level of detail required in the initial Rule 26(a)(1) disclosures should be viewed in light of this reality. A party is not required to interview every witness it ultimately may call at trial in order to provide a summary of the witness's expected testimony. As the information becomes known, it should be disclosed. No summaries are required for adverse parties, including management level employees of business entities, because opposing lawyers are unable to interview them and their testimony is available to their own counsel. For uncooperative or hostile witnesses any summary of expected testimony would necessarily be limited to the subject areas the witness is reasonably expected to testify about. For example, defense counsel may be unable to interview a treating physician, so the initial summary may only disclose that the witness will be questioned concerning the plaintiff's diagnosis, treatment and prognosis. After medical records have been obtained, the summary may be expanded or refined.

Subject to the foregoing qualifications, the summary of the witness's expected testimony should be just that—a summary. The rule does not require prefiled testimony or detailed descriptions of everything a witness might say at trial. On the other hand, it requires more than the broad, conclusory statements that often were made under the prior version of Rule 26(a)(1)(e.g., "The witness will testify about the events in question" or "The witness will testify on causation."). The intent of this requirement is to give the other side basic information concerning the subjects about which the witness is expected to testify at trial, so that the other side may determine the witness's relative importance in the case, whether the witness should be interviewed or deposed, and whether additional documents or information concerning the witness should be sought. See RJW Media Inc. v. Heath, 2017 UT App 34, ¶¶ 23-25, 392 P.3d 956. This information is important because of the other discovery limits contained in the 2011 amendments, particularly the limits on depositions contained in Rule 26.

Likewise, the documents that should be provided as part of the Rule 26(a)(1) disclosures are those that a party reasonably believes it may use at trial, understanding that not all documents will be available at the outset of a case. In this regard, it is important to remember that the duty to provide documents and witness information is a continuing one, and disclosures must be promptly supplemented as new evidence and witnesses become known as the case progresses.

The amendments also require parties to provide more information about damages early in the case. Too often, the subject of damages is deferred until late in the case. Early disclosure of damages information is important. Among other things, it is a critical factor in determining proportionality. The committee recognizes that damages often require additional discovery, and typically are the subject of expert testimony. The Rule is not intended to require expert disclosures at the outset of a case. At the same time, the subject of damages should not simply be deferred until expert discovery. Parties should make a good faith attempt to compute damages to the extent it is possible to do so and must in any event provide all discoverable information on the subject, including materials related to the nature and extent of the damages.

The penalty for failing to make timely disclosures is that the evidence may not be used in the party's case_in-chief. To make the disclosure requirement meaningful, and to discourage sandbagging, parties must know that if they fail to disclose important information that is helpful to their case, they will not be

able to use that information at trial. The courts will be expected to enforce them unless the failure is harmless or the party shows good cause for the failure.

The 2011 amendments also change the time for making these required disclosures. Because the plaintiff controls when it brings the action, plaintiffs must make their disclosures within 14 days after service of the first answer. A defendant is required to make its disclosures within 28 days after the plaintiff's first disclosure or after that defendant's appearance, whichever is later. The purpose of early disclosure is to have all parties present the evidence they expect to use to prove their claims or defenses, thereby giving the opposing party the ability to better evaluate the case and determine what additional discovery is necessary and proportional.

The time periods for making Rule 26(a)(1) disclosures, and the presumptive deadlines for completing fact discovery, are keyed to the filing of an answer. If a defendant files a motion to dismiss or other Rule 12(b) motion in lieu of an answer, these time periods normally would be not begin to run until that motion is resolved.

Finally, the 2011 amendments eliminate two categories of actions that previously were exempt from the mandatory disclosure requirements. Specifically, the amendments eliminate the prior exemption for contract actions in which the amount claimed is \$20,000 or less, and actions in which any party is proceeding pro-se. In the committee's view, those types of actions will benefit from the early disclosure requirements and the overall reduced cost of discovery.

Expert disclosures and timing. Rule 26(a)(3). Expert discovery has become an ever-increasing component of discovery cost. The prior rules sought to eliminate some of these costs by requiring the written disclosure of the expert's opinions and other background information. However, because the expert was not required to sign these disclosures, and because experts often were allowed to deviate from the opinions disclosed, attorneys typically would take the expert's deposition to ensure the expert would not offer "surprise" testimony at trial, thereby increasing rather than decreasing the overall cost. The amendments seek to remedy this and other costs associated with expert discovery by, among other things, allowing the opponent to choose either a deposition of the expert or a written report, but not both; in the case of written reports, requiring more comprehensive disclosures, signed by the expert, and making clear that experts will not be allowed to testify beyond what is fairly disclosed in a report, all with the goal of making reports a reliable substitute for depositions; and incorporating a rule that protects from discovery most communications between an attorney and retained expert. Discovery Disclosure of the identity and subjects of expert opinions and testimony is automatic under Rule 26(a)(3) and parties are not required to serve interrogatories or use other discovery devices to obtain this information.

Disclosures of expert testimony are made in sequence, with the party who bears the burden of proof on the issue for which expert testimony will be offered going first. Within seven days after the close of fact discovery, that party must disclose: (i) the expert's curriculum vitae identifying the expert's qualifications, publications, and prior testimony; (ii) compensation information; (iii) a brief summary of the opinions the expert will offer; and (iv) a complete copy of the expert's file for the case. The copy of the expert's file should include all of the facts and data that the expert has relied upon in forming the expert's opinions. If the expert has prepared summarises of data, spreadsheets, charts, tables, or similar materials, they should be included. If the expert has used software programs to make calculations or otherwise summarize or organize data, that information and underlying formulas should be provided in native form so it can be analyzed and understood. To the extent the expert is relying on depositions or materials produced in discovery, then a list of the specific materials relied upon is sufficient. The committee recognizes that setup at trial, and the costs for preparing these materials can be substantial. For that reason, these types of demonstrative aids may be prepared and disclosed later, as part of the Rule 26(a)(4) pretrial disclosures when trial is imminent.

Within seven days after this disclosure, the party opposing the retained expert may elect either a deposition or a written report from the expert. A deposition is limited to four hours, which is not included in the deposition hours under Rule 26(c)(5), and the party taking it must pay the expert's hourly fee for attending the deposition. If a party elects a written report, the expert must provide a signed report containing a complete statement of all opinions the expert will express and the basis and reasons for

Comment [TP1]: I like this note because it makes clear that you can't start your discovery until at least after the answer is filed. I'm dealing with a case where I filed a MTD rather than answer. The plaintiff served initial disclosures and discovery requests prior to the resolution of the MTD and prior to the filing of an answer. So lets make it clear in the actual rule then delete this note.

Comment [LS2]: This is contrary to the language of the rule. The rule does not require the "expert's file." The rule instead requires all data and other information that will be relied upon by the witness in forming those opinions" The expert is not required to disclose information that will not be relied upon.

them. The intent is not to require a verbatim transcript of exactly what the expert will say at trial; instead the expert must fairly disclose the substance of and basis for each opinion the expert will offer. The expert may not testify in a party's case in chief concerning any matter that is not fairly disclosed in the report. To achieve the goal of making reports a reliable substitute for depositions, courts are expected to enforce this requirement. If a party elects a deposition, rather than a report, it is up to the party to ask the necessary questions to "lock in" the expert's testimony. But the expert is expected to be fully prepared on all aspects of his/her trial testimony at the time of the deposition and may not leave the door open for additional testimony by qualifying answers to deposition questions.

The report or deposition must be completed within 28 days after the election is made. After this, the party who does not bear the burden of proof on the issue for which expert testimony is offered must make its corresponding disclosures and the opposing party may then elect either a deposition or a written report. Under the deadlines contained in the rules, expert discovery should take less than three months to complete. However, as with the other discovery rules, these deadlines can be altered by stipulation of the parties or order of the court.

The amendments also address the issue of testimony from non-retained experts, such as treating physicians, police officers, or employees with special expertise, who are not retained or specially employed to provide expert testimony, or whose duties as an employee do not regularly involve giving expert testimony. This issue was addressed by the Supreme Court in Drew v. Lee, 2011 UT 15, wherein the court held that reports under the prior version of Rule 26(a)(3) are not required for treating physicians.

There are a number of difficulties inherent in disclosing expert testimony that may be offered from fact witnesses. First, there is often not a clear line between fact and expert testimony. Many fact witnesses have scientific, technical or other specialized knowledge, and their testimony about the events in question often will cross into the area of expert testimony. The rules are not intended to erect artificial barriers to the admissibility of such testimony. Second, many of these fact witnesses will not be within the control of the party who plans to call them at trial. These witnesses may not be cooperative, and may not be willing to discuss opinions they have with counsel. Where this is the case, disclosures will necessarily be more limited. On the other hand, consistent with the overall purpose of the 2011 amendments, a party should receive advance notice if their opponent will solicit expert opinions from a particular witness so they can plan their case accordingly. In an effort to strike an appropriate balance, the rules require that such witnesses be identified and the information about their anticipated testimony should include that which is required under Rule 26(a)(1)(A)(ii), which should include any opinion testimony that a party expects to elicit from them at trial. If a party has disclosed possible opinion testimony in its Rule 26(a)(1)(A)(ii) disclosures, that party is not required to prepare a separate Rule 26 (a)(4)(E) disclosure for the witness. And if that disclosure is made in advance of the witness's deposition, those opinions should be explored in the deposition and not in a separate expert deposition. Otherwise, the timing for disclosure of nonretained expert opinions is the same as that for retained experts under Rule 26(a)(4)(C) and depends on whether the party has the burden of proof or is responding to another expert. Rules 26(a)(4)(E) and 26(a)(1)(A)(ii) are not intended to elevate form over substance—all they require is that a party fairly inform its opponent that opinion testimony may be offered from a particular witness. And because a party who expects to offer this testimony normally cannot compel such a witness to prepare a written report, further discovery must be done by interview or by deposition.

Finally, the amendments include a new Rule 26(b)(7) that protects from discovery draft expert reports and, with limited exception, communications between an attorney and an expert. These changes are modeled after the recent changes to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and are intended to address the unnecessary and costly procedures that often were employed in order to protect such information from discovery, and to reduce "satellite litigation" over such issues.

Scope of discovery—Proportionality. Rule 26(b). Proportionality is the principle governing the scope of discovery. Simply stated, it means that the cost of discovery should be proportional to what is at stake in the litigation.

In the past, the scope of discovery was governed by "relevance" or the "likelihood to lead to discovery of admissible evidence." These broad standards may have secured just results by allowing a party to discover all facts relevant to the litigation. However, they did little to advance two equally important

Comment [TP3]: First sentence is quoted by *Willis v. Adams & Smith Inc.*, 2019 UT App 84, ¶33, 443 P.3d 1239, 1248

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objectives of the rules of civil procedure—the speedy and inexpensive resolution of every action. Accordingly, the former standards governing the scope of discovery have been replaced with the proportionality standards in subpart (b)(1).

The concept of proportionality is not new. The prior rule permitted the Court to limit discovery methods if it determined that "the discovery was unduly burdensome or expensive, taking into account the needs of the case, the amount in controversy, limitations on the parties' resources, and the importance of the issues at stake in the litigation." The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure contains a similar provision. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(2) (C). This method of limiting discovery, however, was rarely invoked either under the Utah rules or federal rules.

Under the prior rule, the party objecting to the discovery request had the burden of proving that a discovery request was not proportional. The new rule changes the burden of proof. Today, the party seeking discovery beyond the scope of "standard" discovery has the burden of showing that the request is "relevant to the claim or defense of any party" and that the request satisfies the standards of proportionality. As before, ultimate admissibility is not an appropriate objection to a discovery request so long as the proportionality standard and other requirements are met.

The 2011 amendments establish three tiers of standard discovery in Rule 26(c). Ideally, rules of procedure should be crafted to promote predictability for litigants. Rules should limit the need to resort to judicial oversight. Tiered standard discovery seeks to achieve these ends. The "one-size-fits-all" system is rejected. Tiered discovery signals to judges, attorneys, and parties the amount of discovery which by rule is deemed proportional for cases with different amounts in controversy.

Any system of rules which permits the facts and circumstances of each case to inform procedure cannot eliminate uncertainty. Ultimately, the trial court has broad discretion in deciding whether a discovery request is proportional. The proportionality standards in subpart (b)(2) and the discovery tiers in subpart (c) mitigate uncertainty by guiding that discretion. The proper application of the proportionality standards will be defined over time by trial and appellate courts.

Standard and extraordinary discovery. Rule 26(c). As a counterpart to requiring more detailed disclosures under Rule 26(a), the 2011 amendments place new limitations on additional discovery the parties may conduct. Because the committee expects the enhanced disclosure requirements will automatically permit each party to learn the witnesses and evidence the opposing side will offer in its case-in-chief, additional discovery should serve the more limited function of permitting parties to find witnesses, documents, and other evidentiary materials that are harmful, rather than helpful, to the opponent's case.

Rule 26(c) provides for three separate "tiers" of limited, "standard" discovery that are presumed to be proportional to the amount and issues in controversy in the action, and that the parties may conduct as a matter of right. An aggregation of all damages sought by all parties in an action dictates the applicable tier of standard discovery, whether such damages are sought by way of a complaint, counterclaim, or otherwise. The tiers of standard discovery are set forth in a chart that is embedded in the body of the rule itself. "Tier 1" describes a minimal amount of standard discovery that is presumed proportional for cases involving damages of \$50,000 or less. "Tier 2" sets forth larger limits on standard discovery that are applicable in cases involving damages above \$50,000 but less than \$300,000. Finally, "Tier 3" prescribes still greater standard discovery for actions involving damages in excess of \$300,000. Deposition hours are charged to a side for the time spent asking questions of the witness. In a particular deposition, one side may use two hours while the other side uses only 30 minutes. The tiers also provide presumptive limitations on the time within which standard discovery should be completed, which limitations similarly increase with the amount of damages at issue. A statement of discovery issues will not tell the period. Parties are expected to be reasonable and accomplish as much as they can during standard discovery. A statement of discovery issues may result in additional discovery and sanctions at the expense of a party who unreasonably fails to respond or otherwise frustrates discovery. After the expiration of the applicable time limitation, a case is presumed to be ready for trial. Actions for nonmonetary relief, such as injunctive relief, are subject to the standard discovery limitations of Tier 2, absent an accompanying monetary claim of \$300,000 or more, in which case Tier 3 applies. The committee determined these standard discovery

limitations based on the expectation that for the majority of cases filed in the Utah State Courts, the magnitude of available discovery and applicable time parameters available under the three tiered system should be sufficient for cases involving the respective amounts of damages.

Despite the expectation that standard discovery according to the applicable tier should be adequate in the typical case, the 2011 amendments contemplate there will be some cases for which standard discovery is not sufficient or appropriate. In such cases, parties may conduct additional discovery that is shown to be consistent with the principle of proportionality. There are two ways to obtain such additional discovery. The first is by stipulation. If the parties can agree additional discovery is necessary, they may stipulate to as much additional discovery as they desire, provided they stipulate the additional discovery is proportional to what is at stake in the litigation and counsel for each party certifies that the party has reviewed and approved a budget for additional discovery. Such a stipulation should be filed before the close of the standard discovery time limit, but only after reaching the limits for that type of standard discovery available under the rule. If these conditions are met, the Court will not second-guess the parties and their counsel and must approve the stipulation.

The second method to obtain additional discovery is by a statement of discovery issues. The committee recognizes there will be some cases in which additional discovery is appropriate, but the parties cannot agree to the scope of such additional discovery. These may include, among other categories, large and factually complex cases and cases in which there is a significant disparity in the parties' access to information, such that one party legitimately has a greater need than the other party for additional discovery in order to prepare properly for trial. To prevent a party from taking advantage of this situation, the 2011 amendments allow any party to request additional discovery. As with stipulations for extraordinary discovery, a party requesting extraordinary discovery should do so before the close of the standard discovery time limit, but only after the party has reached the limits for that type of standard discovery available to it under the rule. By taking advantage of this discovery, counsel should be better equipped to articulate for the court what additional discovery is needed and why. The requesting party must demonstrate that the additional discovery is proportional and certify that the party has reviewed and approved a discovery budget. The burden to show the need for additional discovery, and to demonstrate relevance and proportionality, always falls on the party seeking additional discovery. However, cases in which such additional discovery is appropriate do exist, and it is important for courts to recognize they can and should permit additional discovery in appropriate cases, commensurate with the complexity and magnitude of the dispute.

Protective order language moved to Rule 37. The 2011 amendments delete in its entirety the prior language of Rule 26(c) governing motions for protective orders. The substance of that language is now found in Rule 37. The committee determined it was preferable to cover requests for an order to compel, for a protective order, and sanctions in a single rule, rather than two separate rules.

Consequences of failure to disclose. Rule 26(d). If a party fails to disclose or to supplement timely its discovery responses, that party cannot use the undisclosed witness, document, or material at any hearing or trial, absent proof that non-disclosure was harmless or justified by good cause. More complete disclosures increase the likelihood that the case will be resolved justly, speedily, and inexpensively. Not being able to use evidence that a party fails properly to disclose provides a powerful incentive to make complete disclosures. This is true only if trial courts hold parties to this standard. Accordingly, although a trial court retains discretion to determine how properly to address this issue in a given case, the usual and expected result should be exclusion of the evidence.

URCP 26.1

Advisory Committee Note

Rule 26.1 was developed by the Family Law Section of the Utah State Bar. It represents the type of discovery or disclosure rule that the advisory committee anticipated when drafting proposed Rule 26(a).

{01532003-1}

URCP 26.2

Advisory Committee Note

This rule requires disclosure of the key fact elements that are typically requested in initial interrogatories in personal injury actions. The Medicare information disclosure, including Social Security numbers, is designed to facilitate compliance with the requirements for insurers under 42 U.S.C. § 1395y(b)(8)(C). See, Hackley v. Garofano, 2010 WL 3025597 (Conn.Super.) and Seger v. Tank Connection, 2010 WL 1665253 (D.Neb.).

The committee anticipates full disclosures in most cases as a matter of course. However, there may be rare circumstances warranting a protective order in which a party would otherwise have to disclose particularly sensitive information wholly unrelated to the injury at issue, such as a particularly sensitive healthcare procedure or treatment. Information and documents not included in the application for a protective order must be provided within the timeframe of this rule.

This rule is intended to apply to actions based on personal injury and personal sickness using the broad definitions under 26 U.S.C. Sec. 104(a)(2). This includes applies to wrongful death actions, in which case the disclosures will usually be of the decedent's records rather than of the plaintiff's, and emotional distress accompanied by physical injury or physical sickness.

URCP 027

Advisory Committee Notes

For a complete explanation of the 1999 amendments to this rule and the interrelationship of these amendments with the other discovery changes, see the advisory committee note appended to Rule 26. The Supreme Court order approving the amendments directed that the new procedures be applicable only to cases filed on or after November 1, 1999.

URCP 032

Advisory Committee Notes

For a complete explanation of the 1999 amendments to this rule and the interrelationship of these amendments with the other discovery changes, see the advisory committee note appended to Rule 26. The Supreme Court order approving the amendments directed that the new procedures be applicable only to cases filed on or after November 1, 1999.

URCP 034

Advisory Committee Notes

The 2017 amendments to paragraph (b)(2) adopt 1) the specificity requirement in the 2015 amendments to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 34(b)(2)(B), 2) a portion of Federal Rule 34(b)(2)(C) dealing with the basis for an objection to production, and 3) some clarifying language from the federal note.

Rule 35

Advisory Committee Notes

Rule 35 has been substantially revised. A medical examination is not a matter of right, but should only be permitted by the trial court upon a showing of good cause. Rule 35 has always provided, and still provides, that the proponent of an examination must demonstrate good cause for the examination. And, as before, the motion and order should detail the specifics of the proposed examination.

The parties and the trial court should refrain from the use of the phrase "independent medical examiner," using instead the neutral appellation "medical examiner," "Rule 35 examiner," or the like.

The committee has determined that the benefits of recording generally outweigh the downsides in a typical case. The amended rule therefore provides that recording shall be permitted as a matter of course

Comment [RNA4]: Substantive direction, should be deleted or put into the Rule.

unless the person moving for the examination demonstrates the recording would unduly interfere with the examination. Nothing in the rule requires that the recording be conducted by a professional, and it is not the intent of the committee that this extra cost should be necessary. The committee also recognizes that recording may require the presence of a third party to manage the recording equipment, but this must be done without interference and as unobtrusively as possible.

The former requirement of Rule 35(c) providing for the production of prior reports on other examinees by the examiner was a source of great confusion and controversy. It is the committee's view that this provision is better eliminated, and in the amended rule there is no longer an automatic requirement for the production of prior reports of other examinations.

A report must be provided for all examinations under this rule. The Rule 35 report is expected to include the same type of content and observations that would be included in a medical record generated by a competent medical professional following an examination of a patient, but need not otherwise include the matters required to be included in a Rule 26(a)(4) expert report. If the examiner is going to be called as an expert witness at trial, then the designation and disclosures under Rule 26(a)(4) are also required, and the opposing party has the option of requiring, in addition to the Rule 35(b) report, the expert's report or deposition under Rule 26(a)(4)(C). The rule permits a party who furnishes a report under Rule 35 to include within it the expert disclosures required under Rule 26(a)(4) in order to avoid the potential need to generate a separate Rule 26(a)(4) report later if the opposing party elects a report rather than a deposition. But submitting such a combined report will not limit the opposing party's ability to elect a deposition if the Rule 35 examiner is designated as an expert.

URCP 37.

Advisory Committee Notes

The 2011 amendments to Rule 37 make two principal changes. First, the amended Rule 37 consolidates provisions for motions for a protective order (formerly set forth in Rule 26(c)) with provisions for motions to compel. By consolidating the standards for these two motions in a single rule, the Advisory Committee sought to highlight some of the parallels and distinctions between the two types of motions and to present them in a single rule.

Second, the amended Rule 37 incorporates the new Rule 26 standard of "proportionality" as a principal criterion on which motions to compel or for a protective order should be evaluated. As to motions to compel, Rule 37(a)(3) requires that a party moving to compel discovery certify to the court "that the discovery being sought is proportional under Rule 26(b)(2)." Rule 37(b) makes clear that a lack of proportionality may be raised as ground for seeking a protective order, indicating that "the party seeking the discovery has the burden of demonstrating that the information being sought is proportional."

Paragraph (h) and its predecessors have long authorized the court to take the drastic steps authorized by paragraph (e)(2) for failure to disclose as required by the rules or for failure to amend a response to discovery. The federal counterpart to this provision is similar. Yet the courts historically have limited those more drastic sanctions to circumstances in which a party fails to comply with a court order, persists in dilatory conduct, or acts in bad faith.

The 2011 amendments have brought new attention to paragraph (h). Those amendments, which emphasized greater and earlier disclosure, also emphasized the enforcement of that requirement by prohibiting the party from using the undisclosed information as evidence at a hearing. The committee intends that courts should impose sanctions under (e)(2) for failure to disclose in only the most egregious circumstances. In most circumstances exclusion of the evidence seems an adequate sanction for failure to disclose or failure to amend discovery.

2015 Amendments.

Paragraph (a) adopts the expedited procedures for statements of discovery issues formerly found in Rule 4-502 of the Code of Judicial Administration. Statements of discovery issues replace discovery motions, and paragraph (a) governs unless the judge orders otherwise.

Former paragraph (a)(2), which directed a motion for a discovery order against a nonparty witness to be

{01532003-1}

filed in the judicial district where the subpoena was served or deposition was to be taken, has been deleted. A statement of discovery issues related to a nonparty must be filed in the court in which the action is pending.

Former paragraph (h), which prohibited a party from using at a hearing information not disclosed as required, was deleted because the effect of non-disclosure is adequately governed by Rule 26(d). See also *The Townhomes At Pointe Meadows Owners Association v. Pointe Meadows Townhomes, LLC*, 2014 UT App 52 ¶14. The process for resolving disclosure issues is included in paragraph (a).

Additional Note from Tim Pack:

Cases that cite to the Advisory Committee notes to Rule 26 since 2017:

Keystone Ins. Agency, LLC v. Inside Ins., LLC, 2019 UT 20, ¶ 16

Willis v. Adams & Smith Inc., 2019 UT App 84, ¶ 33, 443 P.3d 1239

Ghidotti v. Waldron, 2019 UT App 67, ¶ 16, 442 P.3d 1237, 1242

Luna v. Luna, 2019 UT App 57, ¶ 46, 442 P.3d 1155

<u>Arreguin-Leon v. Hadco Constr. LLC, 2018 UT App 225, ¶ 21, 438 P.3d 25, 32, cert. granted,</u> No. 20190121, 2019 WL 2751143 (Utah May 22, 2019)

<u>MacBean v. Farmers New World Life Ins. Co.</u>, No. 2:17-CV-00131, 2018 WL 3405268, at *3 (D. Utah July 12, 2018)

Northgate Vill. Dev. LC v. Orem City, 2018 UT App 89, ¶ 27, 427 P.3d 391, 399, cert. granted sub nom. Northgate Vill. v. Orem City, 429 P.3d 461 (Utah 2018)

Salo v. Tyler, 2018 UT 7, ¶ 55, 417 P.3d 581, 591

Williams v. Anderson, 2017 UT App 91, 400 P.3d 1071, 1072

RJW Media Inc. v. Heath, 2017 UT App 34, ¶ 23, 392 P.3d 956, 961

{01532003-1} 4826-5066-3079



Nancy Sylvester <nancyjs@utcourts.gov>

Fwd: Section D working group on Civil Rules

Ahstone

Wed, Aug 28, 2019 at 5:43 PM

To: Nancyjs <nancyjs@utcourts.gov>, "Jonathan O. Hafen" <jhafen@parrbrown.com>

Begin forwarded message:

From: Judge Andrew Stone Date: Aug 26, 2019 at 9:27 AM

To: Bryan Pattison, Judge James Blanch, Judge Laura Scott

Subject: Section D working group on Civil Rules

I know Nancy says we probably don't need to be ready on Wednesday, but I thought I'd get the ball rolling with our group by passing along my thoughts on the comments to Rules 41, 43, 45, 47, 50 and 52.

In short, I think we can eliminate all of the comments to these rules (the only rules in our section with comments). Rule 41 explains the history of the rule (it follows the federal rule change) and explains why one section is moved to Rule 52. None of this seems necessary.

Rule 43 encourages telephone hearings. It is unnecessary given the Rule's text.

Rule 45 explains a change from the approved forms contained in the Rules to a form issued by the Board of District Court Judges. It's outdated (Forms are now approved by the Forms Committee) and unnecessary. Folks can find the form on their own. Perhaps retain a reference to "forms for subpoenas may be found at . . . "

47- Is very long and primarily concerns challenges for cause in jury selection. I have to admit I've referred to this frequently, but it really doesn't add anything to the Rule's text. It perhaps gives good context, commentary, and examples for applying the Rule, but isn't that precisely what we are trying to eliminate? The other sections are similar-they purport to add emphasis and encourage practices permitted under the rule beyond the text of the Rule itself. 50 just quotes the federal rules committee. Doesn't add anything to the text of the Rule itself.

52 explains that the provisions for a ruling in a bench trial after a side has finished its case are now in 52 instead of 41. This seems unnecessary and not particularly helpful.

I look forward to hearing all of your thoughts. -Andy

Andrew Stone Third District Judge